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checkpoint

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This commit is contained in:
John Smith
2022-11-09 22:27:37 -05:00
parent e672ae0319
commit 592c83d83a
10 changed files with 299 additions and 325 deletions
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12
veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/mod.rs
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@@ -336,10 +336,14 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/// Determine if a NodeInfo can be placed into the specified routing domain
fn filter_node_info(&self, routing_domain: RoutingDomain, node_info: &NodeInfo) -> bool {
/// Determine if a SignedNodeInfo can be placed into the specified routing domain
fn filter_node_info(
&self,
routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
signed_node_info: &SignedNodeInfo,
) -> bool {
let routing_table = self.routing_table();
routing_table.node_info_is_valid_in_routing_domain(routing_domain, &node_info)
routing_table.signed_node_info_is_valid_in_routing_domain(routing_domain, &signed_node_info)
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@@ -619,7 +623,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
// routing table caching when it is okay to do so
// This is only done in the PublicInternet routing domain because
// as far as we can tell this is the only domain that will really benefit
fn get_sender_signed_node_info(&self, dest: &Destination) -> Option<SignedDirectNodeInfo> {
fn get_sender_signed_node_info(&self, dest: &Destination) -> Option<SignedNodeInfo> {
// Don't do this if the sender is to remain private
// Otherwise we would be attaching the original sender's identity to the final destination,
// thus defeating the purpose of the safety route entirely :P