more punishment cleanup

This commit is contained in:
Christien Rioux 2023-07-21 14:30:10 -04:00
parent 3f59f3bde3
commit 9d3e847a68
9 changed files with 40 additions and 29 deletions

View File

@ -330,7 +330,15 @@ impl Envelope {
self.sender_id
}
pub fn get_sender_typed_id(&self) -> TypedKey {
TypedKey::new(self.crypto_kind, self.sender_id)
}
pub fn get_recipient_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
self.recipient_id
}
pub fn get_recipient_typed_id(&self) -> TypedKey {
TypedKey::new(self.crypto_kind, self.recipient_id)
}
}

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@ -207,6 +207,11 @@ impl Receipt {
pub fn get_sender_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
self.sender_id
}
pub fn get_sender_typed_id(&self) -> TypedKey {
TypedKey::new(self.crypto_kind, self.sender_id)
}
pub fn get_extra_data(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.extra_data
}

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@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
log_net!(debug "envelope failed to decode: {}", e);
// safe to punish here because relays also check here to ensure they arent forwarding things that don't decode
self.address_filter().punish_ip_addr(remote_addr);
return Ok(false);
}
@ -1005,12 +1006,12 @@ impl NetworkManager {
// Peek at header and see if we need to relay this
// If the recipient id is not our node id, then it needs relaying
let sender_id = TypedKey::new(envelope.get_crypto_kind(), envelope.get_sender_id());
let sender_id = envelope.get_sender_typed_id();
if self.address_filter().is_node_id_punished(sender_id) {
return Ok(false);
}
let recipient_id = TypedKey::new(envelope.get_crypto_kind(), envelope.get_recipient_id());
let recipient_id = envelope.get_recipient_typed_id();
if !routing_table.matches_own_node_id(&[recipient_id]) {
// See if the source node is allowed to resolve nodes
// This is a costly operation, so only outbound-relay permitted
@ -1089,15 +1090,18 @@ impl NetworkManager {
) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
log_net!(debug "failed to decrypt envelope body: {}",e);
self.address_filter().punish_ip_addr(remote_addr);
log_net!(debug "failed to decrypt envelope body: {}", e);
// Can't punish by ip address here because relaying can't decrypt envelope bodies to check
// But because the envelope was properly signed by the time it gets here, it is safe to
// punish by node id
self.address_filter().punish_node_id(sender_id);
return Ok(false);
}
};
// Cache the envelope information in the routing table
let source_noderef = match routing_table.register_node_with_existing_connection(
TypedKey::new(envelope.get_crypto_kind(), envelope.get_sender_id()),
envelope.get_sender_typed_id(),
connection_descriptor,
ts,
) {

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@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ impl NetworkConnection {
return RecvLoopAction::Finish;
}
// Punish invalid messages
// Punish invalid framing (tcp framing or websocket framing)
if v.is_invalid_message() {
address_filter.punish_ip_addr(peer_address.to_socket_addr().ip());
return RecvLoopAction::Finish;

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@ -319,10 +319,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
};
// Reply directly to the request's source
let sender_node_id = TypedKey::new(
detail.envelope.get_crypto_kind(),
detail.envelope.get_sender_id(),
);
let sender_node_id = detail.envelope.get_sender_typed_id();
// This may be a different node's reference than the 'sender' in the case of a relay
let peer_noderef = detail.peer_noderef.clone();

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@ -126,17 +126,9 @@ impl RPCMessageHeader {
}
pub fn direct_sender_node_id(&self) -> TypedKey {
match &self.detail {
RPCMessageHeaderDetail::Direct(d) => {
TypedKey::new(d.envelope.get_crypto_kind(), d.envelope.get_sender_id())
}
RPCMessageHeaderDetail::SafetyRouted(s) => TypedKey::new(
s.direct.envelope.get_crypto_kind(),
s.direct.envelope.get_sender_id(),
),
RPCMessageHeaderDetail::PrivateRouted(p) => TypedKey::new(
p.direct.envelope.get_crypto_kind(),
p.direct.envelope.get_sender_id(),
),
RPCMessageHeaderDetail::Direct(d) => d.envelope.get_sender_typed_id(),
RPCMessageHeaderDetail::SafetyRouted(s) => s.direct.envelope.get_sender_typed_id(),
RPCMessageHeaderDetail::PrivateRouted(p) => p.direct.envelope.get_sender_typed_id(),
}
}
}
@ -1464,10 +1456,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
let msg = match &encoded_msg.header.detail {
RPCMessageHeaderDetail::Direct(detail) => {
// Get sender node id
let sender_node_id = TypedKey::new(
detail.envelope.get_crypto_kind(),
detail.envelope.get_sender_id(),
);
let sender_node_id = detail.envelope.get_sender_typed_id();
// Decode and validate the RPC operation
let operation = match self.decode_rpc_operation(&encoded_msg) {

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@ -104,10 +104,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
// We filter on the -outgoing- protocol capability status not the node's dial info
// Use the address type though, to ensure we reach an ipv6 capable node if this is
// an ipv6 address
let sender_node_id = TypedKey::new(
detail.envelope.get_crypto_kind(),
detail.envelope.get_sender_id(),
);
let sender_node_id = detail.envelope.get_sender_typed_id();
let routing_domain = detail.routing_domain;
let node_count = {
let c = self.config.get();

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@ -91,6 +91,13 @@ extension DHTRecordDescriptorExt on DHTRecordDescriptor {
}
return KeyPair(key: owner, secret: ownerSecret!);
}
TypedKeyPair? ownerTypedKeyPair() {
if (ownerSecret == null) {
return null;
}
return TypedKeyPair(kind: key.kind, key: owner, secret: ownerSecret!);
}
}
//////////////////////////////////////

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@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ String cryptoKindToString(CryptoKind kind) {
return "${String.fromCharCode(kind & 0xFF)}${String.fromCharCode((kind >> 8) & 0xFF)}${String.fromCharCode((kind >> 16) & 0xFF)}${String.fromCharCode((kind >> 24) & 0xFF)}";
}
const CryptoKind bestCryptoKind = cryptoKindVLD0;
Uint8List cryptoKindToBytes(CryptoKind kind) {
var b = Uint8List(4);
b[0] = kind & 0xFF;
@ -140,6 +142,8 @@ class TypedKeyPair extends Equatable {
String toJson() => toString();
factory TypedKeyPair.fromJson(dynamic json) =>
TypedKeyPair.fromString(json as String);
factory TypedKeyPair.fromKeyPair(CryptoKind kind, KeyPair keyPair) =>
TypedKeyPair(kind: kind, key: keyPair.key, secret: keyPair.secret);
}
typedef CryptoKey = FixedEncodedString43;