compress envelopes with lz4

This commit is contained in:
Christien Rioux 2023-07-15 21:44:36 -04:00
parent 21ecd64ff8
commit befb100ba4
5 changed files with 51 additions and 21 deletions

7
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@ -3167,6 +3167,12 @@ dependencies = [
"linked-hash-map",
]
[[package]]
name = "lz4_flex"
version = "0.11.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3ea9b256699eda7b0387ffbc776dd625e28bde3918446381781245b7a50349d8"
[[package]]
name = "malloc_buf"
version = "0.0.6"
@ -6414,6 +6420,7 @@ dependencies = [
"keyvaluedb-web",
"lazy_static",
"libc",
"lz4_flex",
"ndk",
"ndk-glue",
"netlink-packet-route 0.15.0",

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@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ serde-big-array = "^0"
json = "^0"
data-encoding = { version = "^2" }
schemars = "0.8.12"
lz4_flex = { version = "0.11.1", default-features = false, features = ["safe-encode", "safe-decode"] }
# Dependencies for native builds only
# Linux, Windows, Mac, iOS, Android

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@ -213,6 +213,10 @@ impl Envelope {
&dh_secret,
);
// Decompress body
let body = decompress_size_prepended(&body)
.map_err(|e| VeilidAPIError::parse_error("failed to decompress", e))?;
Ok(body)
}
@ -223,10 +227,25 @@ impl Envelope {
node_id_secret: &SecretKey,
network_key: &Option<SharedSecret>,
) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
// Ensure body isn't too long
let uncompressed_body_size: usize = body.len() + MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE;
if uncompressed_body_size > MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
apibail_parse_error!(
"envelope size before compression is too large",
uncompressed_body_size
);
}
// Compress body
let body = compress_prepend_size(&body);
// Ensure body isn't too long
let envelope_size: usize = body.len() + MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE;
if envelope_size > MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
apibail_parse_error!("envelope size is too large", envelope_size);
apibail_parse_error!(
"envelope size after compression is too large",
envelope_size
);
}
// Generate dh secret
let vcrypto = crypto
@ -271,7 +290,7 @@ impl Envelope {
}
// Encrypt and authenticate message
let encrypted_body = vcrypto.crypt_no_auth_unaligned(body, &self.nonce.bytes, &dh_secret);
let encrypted_body = vcrypto.crypt_no_auth_unaligned(&body, &self.nonce.bytes, &dh_secret);
// Write body
if !encrypted_body.is_empty() {

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@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ use cfg_if::*;
use enumset::*;
use eyre::{bail, eyre, Report as EyreReport, Result as EyreResult, WrapErr};
use futures_util::stream::FuturesUnordered;
use lz4_flex::block::{compress_prepend_size, decompress_size_prepended};
use parking_lot::*;
use schemars::{schema_for, JsonSchema};
use serde::*;

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@ -102,13 +102,14 @@ impl TableDB {
/// but if the contents are guaranteed to be unique, then a nonce
/// can be generated from the hash of the contents and the encryption key itself
fn maybe_encrypt(&self, data: &[u8], keyed_nonce: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
let data = compress_prepend_size(data);
if let Some(ei) = &self.unlocked_inner.encrypt_info {
let mut out = unsafe { unaligned_u8_vec_uninit(NONCE_LENGTH + data.len()) };
if keyed_nonce {
// Key content nonce
let mut noncedata = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() + PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH);
noncedata.extend_from_slice(data);
noncedata.extend_from_slice(&data);
noncedata.extend_from_slice(&ei.key.bytes);
let noncehash = ei.vcrypto.generate_hash(&noncedata);
out[0..NONCE_LENGTH].copy_from_slice(&noncehash[0..NONCE_LENGTH])
@ -119,23 +120,23 @@ impl TableDB {
let (nonce, encout) = out.split_at_mut(NONCE_LENGTH);
ei.vcrypto.crypt_b2b_no_auth(
data,
&data,
encout,
(nonce as &[u8]).try_into().unwrap(),
&ei.key,
);
out
} else {
data.to_vec()
data
}
}
/// Decrypt buffer using decrypt key with nonce prepended to input
fn maybe_decrypt(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
fn maybe_decrypt(&self, data: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
if let Some(di) = &self.unlocked_inner.decrypt_info {
assert!(data.len() >= NONCE_LENGTH);
if data.len() == NONCE_LENGTH {
return Vec::new();
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let mut out = unsafe { unaligned_u8_vec_uninit(data.len() - NONCE_LENGTH) };
@ -146,9 +147,11 @@ impl TableDB {
(&data[0..NONCE_LENGTH]).try_into().unwrap(),
&di.key,
);
out
decompress_size_prepended(&out)
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))
} else {
data.to_vec()
decompress_size_prepended(data)
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))
}
}
@ -163,7 +166,8 @@ impl TableDB {
let db = self.unlocked_inner.database.clone();
let mut out = Vec::new();
db.iter_keys(col, None, |k| {
out.push(self.maybe_decrypt(k));
let key = self.maybe_decrypt(k)?;
out.push(key);
Ok(Option::<()>::None)
})
.await
@ -214,11 +218,10 @@ impl TableDB {
}
let db = self.unlocked_inner.database.clone();
let key = self.maybe_encrypt(key, true);
Ok(db
.get(col, &key)
.await
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::from)?
.map(|v| self.maybe_decrypt(&v)))
match db.get(col, &key).await.map_err(VeilidAPIError::from)? {
Some(v) => Ok(Some(self.maybe_decrypt(&v).map_err(VeilidAPIError::from)?)),
None => Ok(None),
}
}
/// Read an serde-json key from a column in the TableDB immediately
@ -244,12 +247,11 @@ impl TableDB {
let key = self.maybe_encrypt(key, true);
let db = self.unlocked_inner.database.clone();
let old_value = db
.delete(col, &key)
.await
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::from)?
.map(|v| self.maybe_decrypt(&v));
Ok(old_value)
match db.delete(col, &key).await.map_err(VeilidAPIError::from)? {
Some(v) => Ok(Some(self.maybe_decrypt(&v).map_err(VeilidAPIError::from)?)),
None => Ok(None),
}
}
/// Delete serde-json key with from a column in the TableDB