veilid/veilid-core/src/crypto/receipt.rs
2022-11-12 12:10:38 -05:00

201 lines
6.7 KiB
Rust

#![allow(dead_code)]
#![allow(clippy::absurd_extreme_comparisons)]
use super::*;
use crate::xx::*;
use crate::*;
use core::convert::TryInto;
use data_encoding::BASE64URL_NOPAD;
// #[repr(C, packed)]
// struct ReceiptHeader {
// // Size is at least 8 bytes. Depending on the version specified, the size may vary and should be case to the appropriate struct
// magic: [u8; 4], // 0x00: 0x52 0x43 0x50 0x54 ("RCPT")
// version: u8, // 0x04: 0 = ReceiptV0
// reserved: u8, // 0x05: Reserved for future use
// }
// #[repr(C, packed)]
// struct ReceiptV0 {
// // Size is 106 bytes.
// magic: [u8; 4], // 0x00: 0x52 0x43 0x50 0x54 ("RCPT")
// version: u8, // 0x04: 0 = ReceiptV0
// reserved: u8, // 0x05: Reserved for future use
// size: u16, // 0x06: Total size of the receipt including the extra data and the signature. Maximum size is 1152 bytes.
// nonce: [u8; 24], // 0x08: Randomly chosen bytes that represent a unique receipt. Could be used to encrypt the extra data, but it's not required.
// sender_id: [u8; 32], // 0x20: Node ID of the message source, which is the Ed25519 public key of the sender
// extra_data: [u8; ??], // 0x40: Extra data is appended (arbitrary extra data, not encrypted by receipt itself, maximum size is 1024 bytes)
// signature: [u8; 64], // 0x?? (end-0x40): Ed25519 signature of the entire receipt including header and extra data is appended to the packet
// }
pub const MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE: usize = 1152;
pub const MAX_EXTRA_DATA_SIZE: usize = 1024;
pub const MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE: usize = 128;
pub const RECEIPT_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"RCPT";
pub type ReceiptNonce = [u8; 24];
pub trait Encodable {
fn encode(&self) -> String;
}
impl Encodable for ReceiptNonce {
fn encode(&self) -> String {
BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(self)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
pub struct Receipt {
version: u8,
nonce: ReceiptNonce,
sender_id: DHTKey,
extra_data: Vec<u8>,
}
impl Receipt {
pub fn try_new<D: AsRef<[u8]>>(
version: u8,
nonce: ReceiptNonce,
sender_id: DHTKey,
extra_data: D,
) -> Result<Self, VeilidAPIError> {
if extra_data.as_ref().len() > MAX_EXTRA_DATA_SIZE {
return Err(VeilidAPIError::parse_error(
"extra data too large for receipt",
extra_data.as_ref().len(),
));
}
Ok(Self {
version,
nonce,
sender_id,
extra_data: Vec::from(extra_data.as_ref()),
})
}
pub fn from_signed_data(data: &[u8]) -> Result<Receipt, VeilidAPIError> {
// Ensure we are at least the length of the envelope
if data.len() < MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
return Err(VeilidAPIError::parse_error("receipt too small", data.len()));
}
// Verify magic number
let magic: [u8; 4] = data[0x00..0x04]
.try_into()
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
if magic != *RECEIPT_MAGIC {
return Err(VeilidAPIError::generic("bad magic number"));
}
// Check version
let version = data[0x04];
if version > MAX_CRYPTO_VERSION || version < MIN_CRYPTO_VERSION {
return Err(VeilidAPIError::parse_error(
"unsupported cryptography version",
version,
));
}
// Get size and ensure it matches the size of the envelope and is less than the maximum message size
let size: u16 = u16::from_le_bytes(
data[0x06..0x08]
.try_into()
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
);
if (size as usize) > MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
return Err(VeilidAPIError::parse_error(
"receipt size is too large",
size,
));
}
if (size as usize) != data.len() {
return Err(VeilidAPIError::parse_error(
"size doesn't match receipt size",
format!("size={} data.len()={}", size, data.len()),
));
}
// Get sender id
let sender_id = DHTKey::new(
data[0x20..0x40]
.try_into()
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
);
// Get signature
let signature = DHTSignature::new(
data[(data.len() - 64)..]
.try_into()
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
);
// Validate signature
verify(&sender_id, &data[0..(data.len() - 64)], &signature)
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
// Get nonce
let nonce: ReceiptNonce = data[0x08..0x20]
.try_into()
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
// Get extra data and signature
let extra_data: Vec<u8> = Vec::from(&data[0x40..(data.len() - 64)]);
// Return receipt
Ok(Self {
version,
nonce,
sender_id,
extra_data,
})
}
pub fn to_signed_data(&self, secret: &DHTKeySecret) -> Result<Vec<u8>, VeilidAPIError> {
// Ensure extra data isn't too long
let receipt_size: usize = self.extra_data.len() + MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE;
if receipt_size > MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
return Err(VeilidAPIError::parse_error(
"receipt too large",
receipt_size,
));
}
let mut data: Vec<u8> = vec![0u8; receipt_size];
// Write magic
data[0x00..0x04].copy_from_slice(RECEIPT_MAGIC);
// Write version
data[0x04] = self.version;
// Write size
data[0x06..0x08].copy_from_slice(&(receipt_size as u16).to_le_bytes());
// Write nonce
data[0x08..0x20].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce);
// Write sender node id
data[0x20..0x40].copy_from_slice(&self.sender_id.bytes);
// Write extra data
if !self.extra_data.is_empty() {
data[0x40..(receipt_size - 64)].copy_from_slice(self.extra_data.as_slice());
}
// Sign the receipt
let signature = sign(&self.sender_id, secret, &data[0..(receipt_size - 64)])
.map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
// Append the signature
data[(receipt_size - 64)..].copy_from_slice(&signature.bytes);
Ok(data)
}
pub fn get_version(&self) -> u8 {
self.version
}
pub fn get_nonce(&self) -> ReceiptNonce {
self.nonce
}
pub fn get_sender_id(&self) -> DHTKey {
self.sender_id
}
pub fn get_extra_data(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.extra_data
}
}